Tue 9th May

The Ineffectiveness of Various School Policies in Preventing Active Shooter Incidents

Gershon Ben Keren

Last week, I wrote about some of the differences between active shooter incidents that take place at K-12 schools, and those that occur at colleges and universities. In this article I want to look at the effectiveness of certain policies in preventing and dealing with active shooter incidents, primarily at K-12 schools, however some of these policies and procedures are practiced, enacted, and enforced in colleges and universities.

The Ineffectiveness of Zero Tolerance Policies

Zero-tolerance policies often seem attractive ways to deal with violent offending, because they appear to deal with thoughts of violence before they occur. However, zero-tolerance policies often involve ignoring context e.g., in 2013 a 6-year old, at the Lincoln Elementary School, in Canon City, Colorado, was ordered by his school to attend a reform school for 45-days because he used a cub-scout pen-knife tool to eat his lunch with, and this featured a “knife” (that contravened school policy), along with a spoon and a fork etc. Whilst many people argued that this was political correctness gone mad, the truth is that this is how zero-tolerance policies work; there isn’t room for interpretation – there are no exceptions, and no room for common sense or discretion. At first glance they are appealing, especially when we envisage them being applied to others rather than ourselves e.g., other people who take a certain illegal turn on red, in our neighborhood should be punished, however when we are caught doing it we usually feel/believe it is only fair that we should at the very least be given the opportunity to explain ourselves. Often, zero tolerance policies start off as reasonable and fair, such as anyone caught bringing a gun onto school premises is immediately suspended etc., however often the argument is made that maybe this policy shouldn’t be restricted to only handguns - why not apply it to all weapons? The result being a 6-year old spending 45-days at a reform school; something that did little/nothing to improve school safety. Zero tolerance policies that see mandatory suspensions and expulsions, do not look to change behavior, or address the problems. A teenager who brings a firearm to school is not likely to refrain from doing so because a zero-tolerance policy would see them suspended/expelled. Suspension is likely to result in student disengagement along with an increase in absenteeism, which may in fact increase the likelihood of future violent offending. Whilst zero-tolerance polices offer an attractive and immediate quick fix for dealing with violent and potentially violent students, they are really just kicking the proverbial can down the road.

The Ineffectiveness of Profiling Students

Whenever I write or talk about mental illness or personality disorders, I always start by saying I’m not qualified to diagnose anyone of having/suffering one, and that this can really only be done in a clinical setting by a suitably trained professional. However, I am constantly hearing/reading of people being referred to as narcissists and/or psychopaths, because they are selfish, self-centered and don’t seem to care about others etc. This doesn’t necessarily mean they are narcissists and/or psychopaths but rather that they are self-centered individuals who are happy to use people for their own end, without thought of the consequences for the other party etc. It is easy and convenient to label someone as having a personality disorder, and then developing a profile, based off of this. The FBI provided a list of prototypical personality characteristics, along with social factors that may increase the risk that someone would engage in a school shooting etc., and whilst I have a great deal of respect for the FBI as a law-enforcement institution, their methods of analysis, rarely reach the standards of scientific enquiry i.e., their profiling methods – by their own admissions – rely largely on the interpretation of evidence by profilers, rather than on the evidence alone. Whilst, there are certain “red flags”, which should raise concern these should not be overly simplistic e.g., labelling a student who is simply stating that they wish to kill all their classmates, or profiling an introverted child who has difficulty making social connections, as a would-be killer etc. Whilst, certain “Red Flags” may be a good starting point for thinking about some form of intervention, they shouldn’t be used to determine, judge, and condemn someone as a potential killer. There is also a risk of stigmatizing and labelling those with mental illnesses, and personality disorders as being high risk individuals, due to labelling, when they haven’t exhibited any of the warning signs that would suggest they were.

The Ineffectiveness of Physical Security

I have always advocated that process trumps physicality where security is concerned e.g., you can implement every physical barrier you want, installing bullet-proof glass, blast-proof locks etc., and it doesn’t mean anything if someone forgets to make sure the door or window is properly closed/locked. Some time ago I worked for a bank that had installed “blast proof” curtains in their data center. This meant that if a bomb exploded outside and the windows were smashed inwards, the curtains would catch the glass etc., protecting people and equipment inside. However, there was an issue with this plan. The Bank’s data center was located on a very high floor of a building on Canary Wharf, in London, that had a magnificent view. On almost every one of my “random” inspections of the facility the curtains were drawn back, as people working in the center – understandably – used to pull the curtains back, so that they could enjoy the view. The physical security was there, the process was not. Every report I made, specified that the curtains were drawn back, and never in place etc., however everyone seemed to be “happy” that the physical security “requirement” was in place, even if it wasn’t operational. A certain box had been ticked, and the safety requirements had been met. The Uvalde school shooter, Salvador Ramos, entered Robb Elementary School, via an unlocked side door, that should have been secured. Often physical security measures can be bypassed, and really only serve to slow shooters down, rather than prevent them access, and therefore need to be part of a larger solution e.g., Adam Lanza, entered Sandy Hook elementary school by shooting out a window, bypassing the school’s security system that required visitors to be buzzed in.

Conclusion

There is no single policy that will be effective in preventing every potential killer/killing, however there are anti-violence programs that schools have initiated, and which have been successful in reducing violent offending. The core features and components of these will be looked at in next week’s article.